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Social Security: Can the Promise Be Kept?
An Introduction
Maureen B. Cavanaugh*
Social Security is arguably the most successful social program ever
adopted in the United States. Providing income protection for workers and
their families in retirement, disability, and death, Social Security has signifi-
cantly reduced financial insecurity, especially the elderly's poverty rate.'
Nonetheless, the Social Security program itselfnow faces financial insecurity,
largely because of various demographic factors. The Frances Lewis Law
Center and Washington and Lee University, in a long tradition of promoting
an opportunity for positive dialogue about a subject of national importance,
devoted its Spring 2001 symposium to the question of Social Security reform,
its necessity, and how it might best be effected. Social Security: Can the
Promise Be Kept? considers the demographic factors prompting our concern
with Social Security's long-term viability and, equally importantly, the impli-
cations of any reform for twenty-first-century America's economic and legal
structure. The symposium offered ten leading individuals, including econo-
mists, government policynakers, practitioners, and members ofthe legal acad-
emy, the opportunity to inform the debate concerning Social Security reform
with a wider perspective. By examining in context the program that is avail-
able to all working Americans, cognizant ofother existing programs, especially
employer-provided, tax-qualified plans, the manifold implications of Social
Security reform can be better addressed. The complexity of any Social Secu-
rity reform should not serve as animpedimentto necessary reform. Rather, any
reform adopted should be better able to meet Social Security's needs because
it would recognize related systems and other national priorities.
The baby boom generation's relationship to the economy, as C. Eugene
Steuerle reminded us, has been likened to a pig that was swallowed by a python
and has been moving inexorably through the system. 2 The baby boom genera-
tion has moved through the economy and is now close to retirement, thus
explaining some level of our attentionto the baby boom generation's retirement
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School of Law. BAL, Swarthmore College; M.A., PhD., Cornell University, J.D., University
of Nfinnesota.
1. See Craig Copeland, Social Security Reform Issues, 58 WAsML & LEE L. REv. 1203,
1203 (2001) (noting decrease in poverty rate for elderly "from 35.2% in 1959 to 10.2% in
2000").
2. C. Eugene Steuerle, Social Security: The Broader Issues, 58 WAs-. & LEE L. REV.
1235, 1239 (2001).
1197
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1197 (2001)
security. The desirability of increasing our national savings rate, always an
issue of great concern for economists and policymakers, also explains some of
our concerns as well as some of the proposed solutions.3 In addressing the
immediate problem faced by the Social Security program nationally, we also
have engaged in a re-examination, often without realizing it, of the principal
tenets and competing goals of social insurance- social adequacy and individual
equity. Somewhat surprisingly, individual accounts, which are comprised of
the diversion of some portion of current workers' Social Security taxes to
private accounts, have become the sine qua non of its proponents or the cum
qua non of its opponents in the reform debate.' This resulting narrow focus,
while appearing to address both savings rates and individual equity concerns,
turns out not to be entirely helpful. Whatever reform we adopt must answer not
only the demographic challenges and capital formation needs of our society; it
must do it in a world where the current system of employer-provided, tax-
qualified pensions is shaped by and predicated on the current Social Security
system. The impact of reform for the existing employer-based system, in
which only half of all employers currently participate,6 needs consideration.
If participating employers are now responding to economic trends by shifting
to employees the increased risk and responsibility for providing their own
adequate retirement and health care, we must examine our fundamental com-
mitment to the element of social insurance inherent in the current Social
Security program lest we institute changes that could constitute a rejection of
one ofthe program's basic goals - social adequacy.'
The demographic forces that compel our attention to some manner of
Social Security reform include the declining number of current workers paying
employment taxes that fund payments to an increasing number of retired
beneficiaries who also are living longer. If the ratio of workers to retirees de-
clines from 3:1 to 2:1, the necessary consequence ofa "paygo'Is system must be
3. See Edward M. Gramlich, The Goals of Social SecurityReform, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1229, 1230 (2001) (discussing goal of raising national saving).
4. See Steuerle, supra note 2, at1235 (disagreeing with emphasis on individual accounts
in Social Security reform debate).
5. See Kathryn L. Moore, The Effects of Partial Privatization of Social Security upon
Private Pensions, 58 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1225, 1268-75 (2001) (noting possible effects of
partial privatization on benefits promised by current Social Security system).
6. Moreover, a disproportionate number of employers who participate in the existing
employer-based system are larger employers. EBRI, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYE BENEFTrs
83 (1997).
7. See Regina T. Jefferson, Privatization: Not the Answer for Social Security Reform,
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1314 (2001) (noting that "social adequacy" was one of original
two primary objectives of Social Security).
8. Because current employment taxes are the source of funding for current benefits, the
system is not pre-funded, but is described as a "pay-as-you-go" system. For discussions of fund-
ing as a problem distinct from individual accounts, see the articles included in this symposium
infra.
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either an increase in tax rates, or a decrease in benefits received, or both. Craig
Copeland provides a comprehensive overview, based on the latest Employee
Benefits Research Institute (EBRI) research, of all the demographic trends and
actuarial issues prompting the need for reform.9 Ultimately, he cautions us that
any effort to reform Social Security based on deterministic actuarial models
may well not solve the issues presented by a stochastic economy."
Increasing the revenue available to pay for retirement benefits raises
several issues, including the productivity of future generations and the number
of workers participating inthat future productive economy. The need for new
savings, so that capital will be available for future generations to be as produc-
tive as possible, is a necessary part of any solution. Governor Edward Gram-
lich, former Chair of the Quadrennial Advisory Council on Social Security,
suggests that "add-on" individual accounts might better address this need than
accounts that merely "carve-out" a portion from the existing Social Security
contributions. The demographic factor of retirees generally living longer
should be regarded as a very positive development, although it accounts for at
least some of our concern for Social Security solvency. The problem ofAmeri-
cans spending a relatively greater number of years in retirement than as part of
the workforce could be addressed simply by indexing the retirement age, there-
by allowing each cohort of workers to expect a constant, rather than an increas-
ing, share of work relative to retirement. Governor Gramlich ultimately and
forcefully reminds us that in evaluating any proposal for reform, we must con-
sider the social protections we enjoy and expect - so that we retainthe features
of Social Security's social insurance programthat we do not wantto abandon.1
2
Recognizing the importance we rightfully accord to a successful retire-
ment program, C. Eugene Steuerle further explains that Social Security's
current structure, with its built-in growth, necessarily implicates every other
program to which we currently devote, or need to devote, federal budgetary
resources. 3 The significance of Social Security for our other national priori-
ties is a current, not future, concern. In short, the real Social Security question
is how we as a nation can meet the needs of all our citizens. The provision of
retirement and health benefits understandably affects individual and thus
collective labor force participation rates. Labor force participation rates intum
determine not only the number of contributors to and beneficiaries of the
retirement system itself, but also the number of contributors to and beneficia-
ries of government revenues. If we fail to address the system's rigidities,
9. Copeland, supra note 1, at 1213-14.
10. See Copeland, supra note 1, at 1218-19 (discussing problems associated with basing
Social Security reform program on deterministic actuarial models).
11. Gramlich, supra note 3, at 1231-32.
12. See Gramlch, supra note 3, at 1231-32 (noting concerns associated with Social Secu-
rity reform).
13. Steuerle, supra note 2, at 1236.
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designed in response to problems of an earlier era, we will fail to address the
inadequacy of Social Security in meeting the basic needs of today's elderly.
Thus, Steuerle cautions that our response to the issue of Social Security reform
implicates all our other priorities and how effectively we address the very goal
of Social Security itself- providing benefits to the neediest ofthe elderly.'
4
Once the factors prompting our concern with Social Security's solvency
are disentangled to reveal the variety of issues we confront, we can then begin
to assess the more specific question posed by current reform proposals, namely
the consequences of introducing some form of individual accounts within the
current retirement system. Because Social Security is only one leg ofthe three-
legged stool that comprises our national retirement income system, comple-
menting personal savings and the employer-provided system that is predicated
onthe tax benefits accorded it, we must address the consequences of reform for
both the employer system and individual savings. Katnryn Moore focuses on
the significance of implementing a system of private, individual accounts
within our current retirement income system.' 5 Private employer-provided,
tax-qualified pension plans are expressly coordinated with Social Security
through the integration rules - rules that allow employers to link their private
pension plans expressly with Social Security by including their Social Security
contributions for lower-wage earning employees in their calculation of
employer-provided benefits.' 6 Once we realize how integrated private em-
ployer plans are with Social Security, we must then address the related issues
of how the introduction of private accounts may alter the relative employee
demand for and employer provision of defined benefit 7 plans in contrast to
defined contribution' plans, as well as to employee investment decisions.
Recognizing that Social Security reform necessarily implicates employer-
provided plans should also cause us to consider current trends in employer-
14. See Steuerle, supra note 2, at 1244 (expressing belief that "the Social Security debate
is defined far too narrowly").
15. Moore, supra note 5, at 1268-86.
16. See Moore, supra note 5, at 1261-67 (discussing integration rules generally).
17. Defined benefit plans are plans that provide in retirement a percentage of an individ-
ual's pre-retirement salary by calculating an individual's benefits using a formula, such as a per-
centage of salary and length of service with that employer. ERISA §3(35); see JOHN R. LANG-
BEIN & BRUCEA. WOiK, PENSiON Am EmpLoYE BENEfrLAw 45-47 (3d ed. 2000) (discuss-
ing defined benefit plans generally). The risk of investing and accumulating assets sufficient
to pay that benefit is borne by the employer. Generally, defined benefit plans are paid out as
an annuity for the lives of the individual and surviving spouse.
18. Defined contribution plans are defined as plans providing an individual account for
each participant, wherein benefits are a function of amounts contributed whether by the em-
ployee, employer or both. The amount ultimately available to the individual upon retirement
is a function of the amount contributed annually throughout the individual's career and the
investment history of the account Thus, the risk for adequate resources rests with the individ-
ual. ERISA §3(34); see LANGBEN & Woix, supra note 17, at 47-55 (discussing varieties of
defined contribution plans).
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provided plans. Increasingly, employers are shifting greater risk to individuals
through the use of defined contribution plans - essentially individual ac-
counts. 9 Similarly, individuals are being asked to assume greater responsibil-
ity for the costs of medical insurance, whether as employees or retirees, by
paying for a greater portion of health insurance premiums and other costs.2°
The three-legged retirement income stool, with its diverse support system, is
collapsing in a way that will increasingly require individuals to ensure their
own adequate retirement and health care savings. Regina Jefferson cautions
that a transformation of the Social Security program, paralleling the employer-
provided plan movement away from a life-time annuity provided by defined
benefits plans to the individual saving's account model provided by defined
contribution plans, could leave individuals unprotected by the social safety net
the Social Security program was intended to provide. 1
Individual accounts should, therefore, be analyzed not simply as a solution
addressing the concerns of individual equity and national savings, but also as
a solution that presents significant risk for individuals. The degree of risk ac-
ceptable, individually and collectively, is one for the political sphere. Whether
or not it is addressed at the outset, the administrative decisions that decide the
form of individual accounts will prove decisive. Karen Burke and Grayson
McCouch identify the key administrative issues that raise concerns regarding
acceptable levels of cost, risk, and control.' Standardized low cost accounts
will constrain individual choice but limit risk; higher cost accounts that increase
both individual control and risk may necessitate significantly higher govern-
ment regulation. The Thrift Savings Plan available to federal employees is an
example of a standardized low cost model. Other useful models can be found
internationally, whether in Latin America or among the OECD countries.'
Ultimately, the choice between constrained risk with limited choice and greater
freedom of choice with greater risk is an important decision that we should
evaluate at the outset, not leave for resolution at some fiture date.
Ian Lanoff identifies the central concern for reform based on individual
accounts as the need to limit the risk to individuals from their own investment
19. See Jefferson, supra note 7, at 1302,1306 (noting that individual accounts proposals -
"privatization" - shifts risks to employees).
20. See, e.g., Regina T. Jefferson,Medical SavingsAccounts: Windfallsfor the Healthy,
Wealthy & Wise, 48 CAT. U. L. REv. 685, 690-91 (1999) (describing increased deductibles
as component of MSAs).
21. Jefferson, supra note 7, at 1314-16.
22. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch,Privatizing SocialSecurity: Admin-
istration andImplementation, 58 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1325,1328 (2001) (discussing relation-
ship between proposed system of personal accounts and "decisions concerning acceptable levels
of cost, risk, and control").
23. See Estelle James, Reforming Social Security in the US.: An international Perspec-
five, Bus. ECON., Jan. 2001, at 31, 35-41 (outlining components of multi-pillar model and
comparing different versions of model, including Latin American and OECD versions).
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decisions while increasing investment opportunity, a very real problem cre-
ated by increased individual investment control.24 He finds in ERISA's
fiduciary requirements a "best practices" model that could be transferred to
an individual account system under Social Security.25 Reducing risk to indi-
viduals is motivated by more than mere paternalism or concern with the plight
of unfortunate individuals. Ultimately we all share in increased risk, Lanoff
reminds us, to the extent that the federal government must make whole indi-
viduals whose investment decisions have resulted in poor returns and who
thus have inadequate retirement resources.
Norman Stein also looks to the private pension system to consider its
problems and what those problems might suggest for how we approach Social
Security reform.26 According to Stein, the employer-based pension system is
plagued by problems of leverage, linkage, and leakage.2 By leverage, Stein
identifies the understanding that a qualified plan's tax benefits for business
owners and managers are to be leveraged into increased benefits for lower and
moderate income employees; by linkage, he addresses the desirability of
linking employee plan participation with employee expectations; and by leak-
age, he raises the goal of preserving retirement funds for retirement.8 Given
the very nature ofthe voluntary employer-provided system, it is not surprising
that leverage and linkage are imperfect: Only half of the workforce is cov-
ered, and among those covered, high wage earners represent a significant
number. Participant expectations often diverge from actual benefits. Leakage
contributes to inadequate retirement benefits by allowing employees to use
retirement benefits for current consumption. Ensuring adequate retirement
income for most Americans, and certainly for lower income individuals,
requires that any reform of Social Security address flaws in the current
employer-provided system and individual decision-making.
Ultimately, the symposium contributors offer no easy solutions to either
the concerns regarding Social Security's solvency or the issues raised when
we consider generally the competing goals of social adequacy and individual
equity inherent in any social insurance program. These symposium papers
may encourage us, however, to confront the issues more thoughtfully and thus
to produce a solution that better addresses the very many concerns raised by
Social Security reform.
24. See Ian D. Lanoff & Roberta i. Ufford, ERISA Protections Provide Guidance for
Social Security Privatization, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1353, 1353-54 (2001) (arguing that
individual accounts system would create increased risk for participants).
25. Id. at 1361-68.
26. See generally Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, andLeakage:
Problems with the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform the Social Security
Reform Debate, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1369 (2001) (discussing current employment-based
pension system in context of social security privatization debate).
27. Id. at 1370-1427.
28. Id. at 1371-72.
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